

BRYAN STEIL, WISCONSIN  
CHAIRMAN

LAUREL M. LEE, FLORIDA  
BARRY LOUDERMILK, GEORGIA  
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, VIRGINIA  
GREGORY F. MURPHY, NORTH CAROLINA  
STEPHANIE I. BICE, OKLAHOMA  
MARY E. MILLER, ILLINOIS  
MIKE CAREY, OHIO

MICHAEL PLATT  
STAFF DIRECTOR

One Hundred Nineteenth  
Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION  
1309 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-6157  
(202) 225-8281 | CHA.HOUSE.GOV

JOSEPH D. MORELLE, NEW YORK  
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

TERRI A. SEWELL, ALABAMA  
NORMA J. TORRES, CALIFORNIA  
JULIE E. JOHNSON, TEXAS

JAMIE FLEET  
MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

July 7, 2025

Dr. Madhu Gottumukkala  
Acting Director  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security  
Agency  
1110 N. Glebe Road  
Arlington, VA 20598-0630

Mona Harrington  
Assistant Director for the National Risk  
Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security  
Agency  
1110 N. Glebe Road  
Arlington, VA 20598-0630

Dear Dr. Gottumukkala and Ms. Harrington:

We write again seeking urgent updates on the status of election-related work at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Given the role of the Committee on House Administration and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration as the committees with primary oversight jurisdiction over federal elections, we request answers to the questions included in this letter, as well as a comprehensive briefing on the status of CISA operations and personnel.

CISA's repeated failure to respond to our requests for information while undertaking a significant reshaping of the agency's personnel and mission is unacceptable. We remain deeply troubled by the lack of information CISA has provided to congressional oversight committees and the lack of substantive responses to our questions.

Despite public claims that the agency continues to provide services to the election infrastructure community (including election officials and vendors) that are available to other critical infrastructure owners and operators, we have heard complaints that CISA staff may be afraid to work with state and local election officials and vendors for fear of retribution. If accurate, this is a very serious issue.

Election infrastructure is critical infrastructure and requires the same substantive assistance as other critical infrastructure sectors. As we have noted in prior letters and has been publicly reported, CISA has cut funding<sup>1</sup> and personnel for election security,<sup>2</sup> creating unacceptable

---

<sup>1</sup> Jen Fifield, *U.S. agency has stopped supporting states on election security, official confirms*, Votebeat (Mar. 11, 2025), <https://www.votebeat.org/2025/03/11/cisa-ends-support-election-security-nass-nased/>.

<sup>2</sup> Margaret Brennan, Nicole Sganga & Andrew Triay, *Cybersecurity agency that oversees election infrastructure to faces significant cuts, sources say*, CBS News (Apr. 4, 2025), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cisa-cybersecurity-election-infrastructure-face-significant-cuts-sources-say/>.

doubts about the security of the elections subsector and the level of support and services election officials can continue to expect from CISA.

We remain seriously concerned with reports that CISA plans to cut some 1,300 staff—about half its full-time workforce—and another 40 percent of its contractors,<sup>3</sup> and set a May 21, 2025 deadline for CISA employees to decide whether or not they would opt-in to a workforce transition program.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, it is our understanding that many employees have already begun the process of leaving CISA—or have already departed—and that restructuring may already be underway.<sup>5</sup> The agency’s continued failure to provide any modicum of transparency to Congress and the public is unacceptable.

As we have reiterated in prior letters, CISA, and the broader Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have a responsibility to be transparent and responsive to congressional committees. While we continue to wait for comprehensive responses to our February 13, March 4, and April 17, 2025, letters, the continued staffing changes and funding cuts at CISA have resulted in additional questions.

To that end, the *New York Times* reported on June 24, that Edward Coristine—the 19-year-old DOGE employee with a known history as a cybersecurity risk and who was reportedly involved in DOGE activities at DHS—recently resigned.<sup>6</sup> The fact that this individual was still employed by the federal government and that you have failed to provide any meaningful response to our questions regarding DOGE’s access to CISA, raises serious concerns.

We expect a comprehensive response to our prior questions and the additional questions below no later than **July 21**. Additionally, we reiterate our request for the latest copy of CISA and DHS’s review of its election security mission, and our request and expectation of a fulsome briefing on the agency’s assessment, including an update on prior, current, and expected changes at CISA, and a detailed explanation of the rationale behind such changes.

Regarding CISA’s reorganization and personnel:

1. What is the status of CISA’s reorganization?
2. Who is responsible for the reorganization plan and its execution?
3. What level of involvement did DOGE have in CISA’s personnel decisions?
4. What access were DOGE employees granted to CISA’s information systems and data? What access do DOGE employees still have? What steps has the agency taken to ensure this data remains internal to the agency and secure?
5. How many federal employees currently remain at CISA, excluding those who have opted into a workforce transition program? Please provide the numbers by division.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dina Temple-Raston & Suzanne Smalley, *Trump administration planning major workforce cuts at CISA*, The Record (Apr. 10, 2025), <https://therecord.media/trump-administration-planning-workforce-cuts-at-cisa>.

<sup>4</sup> Chris Riotta, *CISA Grapples With Growing Exodus, Workforce Buyout Turmoil*, GovInfo Security (Apr. 25, 2025), <https://www.govinfosecurity.com/cisa-grapples-growing-exodus-workforce-buyout-turmoil-a-28092>.

<sup>5</sup> David Jones, *CISA launches new wave of job cuts*, Cybersecurity Dive (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/cisa-job-cuts/745483/>.

<sup>6</sup> Chris Cameron & Nicholas Nehamas, *Key Members of Musk’s DOGE Resigns From Government*, NY Times (Jun. 24, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/24/us/politics/big-balls-edward-coristine-musk-doge.html>.

6. How many CISA employees opted-into the deferred resignation program?
7. How many CISA employees opted-into the Voluntary Early Retirement Authority program?
8. How many CISA employees opted-into the Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment program?

Regarding CISA's election security work:

1. Which division is currently responsible for CISA's election security work?
2. What is the status of the CISA/DHS assessment of CISA's election security work?
3. CISA has indicated that its assessment of election security work has not impacted the ability of election officials to access cyber and physical security assessments.
  - a. How many requests for physical security assessments has CISA received from election officials since January 2025, and how many physical security assessments have been conducted?
  - b. How many requests for cybersecurity assessments has CISA received from election officials since January 2025, and how many cybersecurity assessments has CISA conducted?
  - c. Is CISA continuing to sponsor security clearances for election officials?
  - d. Is CISA continuing to create and update products and guidance documents for the election infrastructure subsector?
  - e. Is CISA continuing to provide election officials with cyber, physical, and operational security trainings and exercises?
4. In May 2024, then-Director Easterly testified to Congress that CISA provided weekly Vulnerability Scanning reports to nearly 1,000 election infrastructure stakeholders identifying vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations to improve cybersecurity of systems, such as online voter registration systems, and other election management systems.<sup>7</sup> Is CISA continuing to provide Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning services for election infrastructure systems and networks?
5. CISA did significant work to protect election infrastructure against the risk of foreign malign influence operations during the 2024 election cycle. What work does CISA plan to continue to do to protect election infrastructure from foreign malign influence operations?
6. What steps has CISA taken to ensure that election officials and vendors know what services are still available to them?
7. What is the status of the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council and the Election Infrastructure Subsector Sector Coordinating Council?
8. What is the status of the comprehensive evaluation of CISA's activities over the last six years, and the joint report as ordered by the April 9, 2025, Presidential Memorandum entitled "Addressing Risks from Chris Krebs and Government Censorship"?

---

<sup>7</sup> *An Update on Foreign Threats to the 2024 Elections*: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, 118<sup>th</sup> Cong. (2024), written testimony of Jen Easterly.

The security of our nation's election infrastructure is a vital component of our free, fair, and secure elections. We appreciate your attention to this serious matter and expect your answers no later than **Monday, July 21**.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Joseph D. Morelle in blue ink, written over a horizontal line.

Joseph D. Morelle  
Member of Congress  
Ranking Member  
Committee on House Administration

Handwritten signature of Alex Padilla in black ink, written over a horizontal line.

Alex Padilla  
United States Senator  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Rules and Administration